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Michael Galchinsky

The Jewish Settlements in the
West Bank: International Law
and Israeli Jurisprudence

M

any who care about Israel have learned to stop caring about
international law. After all, for forty years, Arab states, members of the
Non-Aligned Movement and the former Soviet Union, have ceaselessly and
atrociously manipulated international law so as to turn Israel into a pariah
state among the nations. The UN’s infamous resolutions equating Zionism
with racism are only the best known examples.¹ Each spring, when the UN
Commission on Human Rights rolls out its allegations of Israeli human
rights violations, this political body holds Israel to a far higher standard
than it does states that have demonstrated far less commitment to the
Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter.² For good reasons, many who
love Israel have honed their contempt for international law.³
It can be hard to remember how much energy and optimism Jewish
leaders invested in the development of international law in the two decades
immediately following the Shoah. Those leaders recalled all too well what
had happened when the ﬁrst international legal system, the League of
Nations, had disintegrated and left Nazi Germany without check, to treat
its citizens in its own way. Now, it is hard to remember that it was the
American Jewish Committee that convinced the states’ representatives at
the San Francisco Conference in 1945 that human rights should become
one of the pillars of the UN’s mission. Or that it was René Cassin, president
of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, who drafted the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Or that a Polish Jew, Raphael Lemkin, coined
the term “genocide” and pushed through the UN Genocide Convention.
Or that two generations of American Jewish leaders saw international law
as one of the cornerstones of their Never Forget/Never Again program,
consistent with core Jewish values like tikkun olam, ger lo tilhaz, b’tselem
elohim, kevod haberiyyoth, mippene darkhe shalom, and ben adam l’ havero.
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For most of these leaders, support for internationalism in no way conﬂicted with their support for Jewish nationalism. They saw the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the State of Israel as the twin births of
1948—both dedicated to making Jews safe from persecution.⁴
If Israelis and their allies in the Diaspora have, since 1967, largely
given up on international law, however, the rest of the world has not.
The success of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia led, in 2002, to the establishment of a permanent International
Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. Even without American ratiﬁcation of the ICC statute,
international criminal law is arguably stronger now than at any time since
the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Remembering Jews’ historical commitment to international justice,
we can only observe with grave concern the extent to which Israeli and
international law have gradually gone their separate ways over the proper
approach to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In particular,
the issue of the settlements has raised the conﬂict between the two legal
systems to its highest pitch. The tension has grown so acute that, if it is not
alleviated soon, it may have severe consequences for Israel’s future peace
and security.

I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before comparing the approaches adopted by the two legal systems, it is
necessary to establish brieﬂy the history and current scope of the settlements. Since 1967, successive Israeli governments have, directly or indirectly, participated in the transfer of some 230,000 civilians into 145 West
Bank and Gaza settlements and approximately 110 outposts.⁵ Israeli civilian
settlement in the territories began as a response of the Eshkol government
to political pressure to re-settle the Gush Etzion villages and to establish a
permanent presence in the Golan Heights. Following the Israeli victory in
the Six-Day War, Golda Meir’s government came under enormous pressure
to settle in all parts of the biblical Land of Israel. She responded with eﬀorts
to develop a small number of security-oriented settlements in Sinai, the
Golan, and the Jordan Valley. The Jordan Valley settlements, the ﬁrst in
the West Bank, were conceived under the Allon Settlement Plan (adopted
in 1974 but circulating since 1970) as agricultural settlements that would
serve as outposts on Israel’s Eastern front. Settlers, led by Gush Emunim
leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger, also had early successes in manipulating the
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Labor government into supporting their extended stay in the Park Hotel
in the city of Hebron, and eventually their establishment of Qiryat Arba
on the outskirts of the city.⁶ Still, under the Eshkol, Meir, and Rabin governments there was not a great deal of civilian population transfer. By the
time Menachem Begin and the Likud came to power in 1977, there were
a total of 3200 settlers.⁷
As Begin biographers Ilan Peleg and Sasson Sofer have shown, Begin
brought the religious right’s Greater Israel theology, a territorial imperative, and a diplomacy of annexation into the political mainstream, thereby
opening the gates of settlement.⁸ By the end of his second government as
Prime Minister in 1983, the number of settlers had increased to 28,400.⁹
Moreover, Begin’s second Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, along with his
Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, were to become the architects of a
concerted expansion of the “facts on the ground.” By contrast with the
small amount of government support that West Bank civilian settlers
received in the ﬁrst decade after the Six-Day War, in recent years, they
have received government mortgage and housing subsidies, tax incentives,
business grants, free schooling, infrastructure projects, and defense—to the
tune of about $146 million in 2002. Since the Oslo Accords were signed in
1993, there has been a 55 growth in settlement housing and a 100 growth
in the settler population. Between 1994 and 1997, the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) built 180 miles of bypass roads in the territories to protect settlers
from sniping, bombing, and drive-by shootings.¹⁰ The Military Commander has directed hundreds of thousands of gallons of aquifer water to
settlements for household, agricultural, and landscaping needs.¹¹
At ﬁrst glance, international law seems quite plainly to prohibit all of
these activities. No prohibition could seem more straightforward than the
one found in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the one on protecting civilians in time of war, adopted on August 12, 1949. The Convention’s Article
49, sixth paragraph, reads as follows: “The Occupying Power shall not . . .
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”¹²
The phrasing of this prohibition is absolute, permitting no exceptions.
Israel ratiﬁed the Geneva Conventions on July 6, 1951. Moreover, by now, in
the view of virtually all international lawyers and every state but Israel, the
Geneva Conventions have become customary international law, meaning
that every state is bound by them, whether it has formally become a Party
to the treaties or not. From this standpoint, it makes no diﬀerence whether
one is referring to Labor’s security-oriented settlements of the 1970s, the
Likud-backed Gush Emunim settlements of the 1980s, Sharon’s suburban
dormitory settlements around Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv of the 1990s, or the
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outposts of the new century.¹³ On the peshat reading of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, they are all illegal.
The Article 49 prohibition is based on the so-called “law of belligerent occupation,” a part of the traditional Law of Nations that was ﬁrst
published in 1907 in the Regulations to Hague Convention IV. The Israeli
High Court of Justice recognizes the Hague Regulations as a binding part
of customary international law.¹⁴ According to the Regulations, “Territory
is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.”¹⁵ That is, to be occupied, territory need not belong to any
sovereign state; it need only be placed under the hostile army’s eﬀective
control. A number of the Hague Regulations insist that occupation must
have the character of a temporary trusteeship. For example, one Regulation
speciﬁes that the occupier is to respect and administer the laws already in
force in the territory unless absolutely prevented from doing so.¹⁶ While
all utilities may be seized, they “must be restored and compensation ﬁxed
when peace is made.”¹⁷ The temporary nature of occupation is most explicit
with regard to land use. In the words of Article 55, the Occupying Power
“shall be regarded only as administrator . . . of . . . real estate. . . . It must
safeguard the capital of these properties.”¹⁸
The implication is that the occupier administers the territory for the
inhabitants while hostilities continue, but must return it to them more or
less intact when peace has been concluded. The purpose of these provisions
is to prevent occupiers from colonizing or annexing territory. The law of
belligerent occupation aims to protect the territorial integrity of existing
states, to discourage aggression, and to stabilize world order. While the
Hague Regulations do not speciﬁcally mention an occupier’s resettlement of its own civilians, such resettlement, if it appears as a means of de
facto annexation or colonization of the occupied territory, cuts manifestly
against their grain.¹⁹
During the half-century that followed the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions, the law regarding occupant resettlement became ever more
stringent. Since 1967, the US has voted in favor of ten Security Council
resolutions that criticized Israel’s failure to abide by the Fourth Geneva
Convention, including Article 49, and demanded that Israel cease settlement activities and dismantle existing settlements.²⁰ Most recently, the
drafters of the 1998 Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court, classiﬁed resettlement as a war crime within the
court’s jurisdiction.²¹
Yet, while consistent and clear, international humanitarian norms have
so far been largely unenforceable. While the Security Council resolutions
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clearly establish the international norm that the Fourth Convention applies
to the settlements, the Council has so far never exercised its powers under
chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter to enforce the norm. (This is not
something President Bush calls attention to when criticizing the Council’s
track record on enforcement.) Moreover, for a number of reasons to be
explored in a moment, the Rome Statute’s reclassiﬁcation of resettlement
as a war crime is also unenforceable, and can have no practical eﬀect on the
situation in the territories right now. However, both sources of law do serve
to indicate where the international law of war is heading on this issue.
In addition to being charged with violating the law of war, Israel’s
resettlement policy has been charged with numerous violations of international human rights law. The UN treaty bodies that monitor states’ implementation of the International Bill of Rights, have determined that the
West Bank and Gaza are under their jurisdiction, and that the settlements
have resulted in Israel’s violation of Palestinians’ rights to self-determination, use of natural resources, equality, property, an adequate standard of
living, and freedom of movement.²²

II. ISR AELI JURISPRUDENCE
From a number of perspectives, international law has prohibited the Israeli
settlements. Yet Israeli oﬃcials have generally ignored or dismissed international law and have relied instead on the opinions of Israeli jurists and
legal theorists, who have treated this issue quite diﬀerently.²³ Theoretically,
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into
force, January 27, 1980), international law trumps national law when there
is a conﬂict.²⁴ Practically speaking, however, Israel has been able to observe
this rule in the breach by refusing to sign the Vienna Convention. (This
does not necessarily relieve Israel of the obligations of the Convention, if the
treaty’s provisions have been recognized as customary international law.)
Two conditions have enabled Israeli national jurisprudence to prevail in
regulating resettlement. The enforcement vacuum noted above has meant
that Israel is under no compulsion to respond to international criticisms, as
long as it is willing to bear the political consequences for ignoring its treaty
commitments. Second, the decades of manifest unfairness and politicization of the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂict in the Zionism=Racism resolution,
condemnations by the Commission on Human Rights, UNESCO, and
so on, have enabled Israeli oﬃcials to mischaracterize and dismiss all UN
human rights bodies as anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic.
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It is therefore quite important to understand the extent to which Israeli
legal theorists and jurists have diﬀered in their approach from international
norms. According to the 1968 “missing reversioner” theory advanced by
Yehuda Z. Blum, Jordan’s aggression against Israel in 1967 caused it to lose
its title to the West Bank, creating a sovereignty vacuum that Israel stepped
in to ﬁll. In that case, the Fourth Convention would not apply because
Israel had not occupied another state’s sovereign territory, there was no
sovereign to whom the territory could revert, and the settlements could not
be in violation of the Convention.²⁵ Besides, the Convention is designed
for armed hostilities between states that are parties to the treaty (Fourth
Convention, Art. 2); the territories do not comprise a state and therefore
cannot be a party.²⁶ Finally, the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂict does not ﬁt
into the Convention’s deﬁnition of an “armed conﬂict not of an international character,” because the conﬂict occurs in a non-state territory rather
than “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” (Art. 3).
According to this argument, under the terms of the Convention, the
Israeli/Palestinian struggle cannot be classiﬁed as either an international
armed conﬂict or a non-international armed conﬂict, and these are the
only conﬂicts covered by the Convention’s deﬁnition of “occupied territory.” Thus, Article 49’s prohibition cannot be applied to the West Bank
settlements.
With the rise of Menachem Begin, the Likud government took this
theory further and claimed that, in the absence of a sovereign, Israel had
in fact taken title to the territory, based on the Jews’ ancient ancestral and
biblical claim to the entire Land of Israel. Begin said, “You can annex
foreign land. You cannot annex your own country. Judea and Sumaria
are part of the land of Israel [Eretz Yisrael], where the nation was born.”²⁷
This is a clear statement of Begin’s policy of de facto annexation through
settlement.²⁸
The Israeli Foreign Ministry has also contributed a rationale for rejecting Israel’s de jure obligation to uphold the Fourth Convention, arguing
that the Convention only prohibits civilian transfers compelled by the
government, not voluntary transfers undertaken by the civilians themselves. Recall the language of Article 49: “The Occupying Power shall not
transfer its own civilians into the territory it occupies” (emphasis added).
On the Foreign Minister’s reading, even if the Geneva Convention applies,
voluntary transfers do not violate it, because the Occupying Power is not
doing the transfer.²⁹
It is worth noting that the “Greater Israel” theory has been disputed
by prominent Israeli legal authorities. Yoram Dinstein, a Professor of
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International Law at Tel-Aviv University and the editor of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, argued that the Fourth Convention “does not make
its applicability conditional on recognition of titles” and that “[t]he most
basic tenet of the law of belligerent occupation is that occupation as such
does not transfer title to the territory.”³⁰ For Dinstein, the West Bank is
a case of textbook belligerent occupation, and must be treated as such. A
third theory, advanced by Moshe Drori and Thomas Kuttner, held that
the territory was neither a sovereignty vacuum to be ﬁlled by Israel, nor
a traditional occupied territory to be administered until the sovereign’s
return at the conclusion of diplomatic negotiations. Rather, the West Bank
was being held by a “trustee-occupant,” administering the area until the
residents were ready to take over. Under this theory, Israel had become the
new power exercising a mandate over the region, operating in the absence
of a sovereign, aware of its temporary status, and aiding the inhabitants to
become self-governing. As a trustee-occupant, the administration would
still be based on the principles of occupation articulated in Art. 49.³¹
International law also takes issue with the various justiﬁcations of
the settlement policy. On the ﬁrst issue, the inapplicability of Geneva law
to conﬂicts other than wars between states parties or those occurring on
states parties’ territory, international treaties and case law subsequent to
the Geneva Conventions have sought to broaden the law of war to encompass armed conﬂicts between state and non-state entities. Both Protocol
I, a treaty of 1977, as well as a recent judgment from the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) assert that the laws
of war can apply in armed conﬂicts between a state and a non-state entity.
The ICTY judges assert that such conﬂicts must be treated as though they
were interstate conﬂicts for the purpose of the application of Geneva law.³²
Moreover, since Geneva law is accepted as customary everywhere but in
Israel,³³ the question of whether the territory is under the sovereign control
of a High Contracting Party is no longer relevant. From this point of view,
the prohibition of resettlement is applicable in the West Bank even though
the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is an armed conﬂict between a state and a
non-state entity occurring in a territory belonging to no state party.
On the issue of voluntary transfers, the Rome Statute disagrees with
the Foreign Minister. The Statute classiﬁes as a war crime, “The transfer,
directly or indirectly, of parts of the Occupying Power’s own civilian population into the territory it occupies” [emphasis added].³⁴ The drafters of
the Rome Statute added the phrase “directly or indirectly” to the Fourth
Convention language in order to reﬂect customary international law’s
prohibition against government encouragement of voluntary resettlement
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through subsidies, incentives, and defense.³⁵ Such indirect means have, of
course, been a part of Israeli government policy since the Allon Settlement
Plan of 1970, and especially since the Drobles Plan of 1978, as revised by
Likud governments in 1980 and 1983.³⁶ So here, the Foreign Minister and
international law are at odds.
For the most part, however, rather than arguing for the inapplicability
of particular provisions in the Fourth Convention, the Israeli High Court
of Justice has denied outright the Convention’s jurisdiction over Israel’s
activities in the territories.³⁷ In 1980, in a case brought by the Palestinian
mayors of Hebron and Nablus who had been deported to Lebanon, the
Court rejected the status of the Fourth Convention as customary international law and discounted its binding nature, claiming that the treaty
“belongs to conventional international law [as opposed to customary international law], which does not form part of Israeli municipal law unless
incorporated by legislation.”³⁸ On the Court’s reading, the Convention
is non-self-executing, meaning that even though Israel ratiﬁed the treaty,
the government is not bound to apply it unless the Knesset ﬁrst passes a
law to that eﬀect. Again, Israeli and international law disagree: the U.N.
Security Council has (with United States support) repeatedly asserted that
the Fourth Convention is customary, applicable, and binding.³⁹
The High Court’s rejection of the applicability of the Geneva Convention and all later treaties relevant to civilian transfer has compelled it to
rest its decisions regarding the settlements on the undisputed customary
law of belligerent occupation as declared in the 1907 Hague Regulations.⁴⁰
In the Regulations, the Israeli High Court has been able to ﬁnd warrant
for certain kinds of civilian resettlement in the territories. Article 43 of the
Regulations permits the occupant to alter existing conditions when absolutely necessary to ensure “public order and safety.” The High Court has
interpreted the phrase “public order and safety” to mean the IDF can alter
existing conditions in cases of “military need.” This interpretation enabled
the court, in the Beth El case of March 1979,⁴¹ to decide that “military
need” justiﬁed the Military Commander in requisitioning privately-owned
Palestinian land in the West Bank to be turned over to the civilian government for settlement construction. The Court wrote that “Jewish settlements in occupied territories serve actual and real security needs” inasmuch
as civilian settlers can report suspicious activities of occupied inhabitants
to the IDF. This decision seemed to establish the legal basis by which the
Military Commander could requisition hundreds of thousands of acres of
privately-owned Palestinian land for settlement construction.⁴²
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Yet only nine months later, the High Court issued a landmark decision in the Elon Moreh case—a case involving the IDF’s requisition of
privately held Palestinian land for a new Gush Emunim settlement in the
West Bank.⁴³ Here, the court used the condition of “military need” to
rule against the Military Commander and ﬁnd the requisition order null
and void, determining that the new settlement was primarily motivated by
political and religious concerns rather than military need.⁴⁴ In Elon Moreh,
the Court placed a limit on the kinds of settlements that could be justiﬁed
as military needs. It said:
the decision to establish a permanent settlement intended from the outset
to remain in its place forever—even beyond the duration of the military
government which was established in Judea and Sumaria—encounters a
legal obstacle which is insurmountable, because military government cannot
create in its area facts for its military needs which are designed ab initio
[from the outset] to exist even after the end of the military rule in that area,
when the fate of the area after the termination of military rule is still not
known. . . .⁴⁵

So the court’s interpretation of the Hague Regulations in Beth El and Elon
Moreh enabled it to determine that some settlements were lawful—those
serving military need and intended to be of only temporary duration—
while others were not. This approach was far diﬀerent, of course, from
the Fourth Convention and the Rome Statute, which simply prohibit
resettlement altogether.
In the wake of Elon Moreh, the Begin government ceased to requisition
private lands. Its new approach was to reclassify all unregistered lands in
the West Bank as “state lands” unless individuals could come forward with
title papers. Prior to 1967, the Ottoman and Jordanian law in force in the
West Bank did not require title papers and registration; this meant that
many Palestinians could not prove ownership of land their families had
worked for generations. This strategy depended on a wholesale reinterpretation and invalidation of much of the existing law in force in the occupied
territory, in violation of the Hague Regulations. Nevertheless, it resulted in
the government claiming about 40 of the West Bank as state land, about
2,150,000 dunams (or about half a million acres).⁴⁶ Since 1979, 90 of all
new settlements have been built on these state lands.⁴⁷ By refusing to rule
on the legality of settlement construction on state lands, the Israeli courts
have embarked on a collision course with international law, since as we have
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seen, the Hague Regulations require the Occupying Power to refrain from
substantial alterations to the real estate under its eﬀective control.
The Court’s reliance on the Hague Regulations has, in any case,
resulted in a decision record that frequently diﬀers from international
norms. For one thing, when the court decided in Beth El that civilian
settlers can serve military needs, it seemed to place settlers somewhere
between civilians and combatants. Inasmuch as the civilian/combatant
distinction is the fundamental basis for the international law of war, this
decision was in conﬂict with that law.
In cases relating to the human rights of the settlers themselves, the
High Court has also departed from the distinction in international law
between occupied and occupier. In one case, the High Court found that
even though Jewish settlers are Israeli citizens, they are under IDF administration, and, like Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, may be subject
to detention without charge, trial, or counsel.⁴⁸ From the standpoint of
international human rights, which frowns upon administrative detention,
the High Court’s ruling appears to result in violation of the settlers’ human
rights.⁴⁹ Here, the court treated settlers as though they were occupied
rather than occupier.
Overall, the status of the settlers in Israeli jurisprudence has been
quite ﬂuid. In some cases the court treats them as occupant civilians, in
others as occupied civilians, and in others as combatants. This ﬂuidity in
itself creates a conﬂict with the international law of war, because the latter
seeks to provide a single, clearly deﬁned status for each type of participant
in armed hostilities. From the perspective of international law, the Israeli
decisions have lacked any discernible philosophical foundation. On the
other hand, from the Israeli High Court’s perspective, the neat, consistent
logic of the Geneva norms fails to address the messy conditions of actual
armed conﬂict.

III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE LAW
The High Court’s retort emphasizes the importance of contextualization
in understanding and applying law in situations of armed conﬂict. Indeed,
while law is the necessary basis for a comprehensive consideration of Israeli
policy towards the settlements, it can never be suﬃcient. Other factors that
would have to be incorporated include:
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the historical development of Israeli policy toward the settlements
the impact of the settlements on Israeli domestic politics
their impact on the Israeli economy
their impact on West Bank topography, land use, and administration
their impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conﬂict, and on the broader
Middle East conﬂict
the relation between the settlements and the security barrier
their impact on Israeli foreign relations, especially with the United
Nations, the United States, and the European Union
use of U.S. loan guarantees for purposes of settlement expansion
water security issues
border security issues
the historical and ideological development of the various segments of
the settler movement
settlement and the ideologies of Zionism
the development of Israeli human rights and refusenik movements
settlers and settlements in Israeli popular culture and the arts

Three examples will illustrate the crucial role that context plays in the
interpretation of the law. First, border security issues profoundly aﬀect the
application of the law of belligerent occupation to the settlements. According to UN Security Council Resolution 242 ( June 14, 1967) Israel must
return “territories” occupied during the Six-Day War. While Palestinian
representatives have always held that this means Israel must return all territories captured, the Israeli government has always held that the absence of
the deﬁnite article (the territories) means that Israel must return only some
of the captured territories. On Israel’s reading, the resolution recognizes
that the Green Line is a cease-ﬁre line rather than a permanent border, providing some small margin on either side of the line open to negotiation.
From this point of view, in a negotiated peace treaty, Israel’s borders
could be slightly expanded, and this expansion could have the eﬀect of
conferring lawfulness for the future on a number of settlements, even if
such settlements had been established illegally. This was the solution unofﬁcially reached by negotiators from both sides at the Clinton-brokered
talks in Taba, Egypt in January 2001.⁵⁰ In that understanding (reﬂected
in the approach taken in the recent private initiative known as the Geneva
Accord) the suburban dormitory settlements around Jerusalem, ﬁrst built
in the late 1980s and 1990s, are to be included in the permanent borders
of Israel, in exchange for an equal amount of Israeli land ceded to the new
state of Palestine. Thus, while the Fourth Geneva Convention makes all
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civilian resettlement unlawful, another legitimate source of international
law, a Security Council Resolution, seems to permit a narrow exception
when border security issues are in question.
While this security-based argument seems persuasive for some of
the Jerusalem settlements, a similar argument will probably not hold up
when applied to the other main line of settlements built along a border:
the kibbutzim and moshavim built by Labor as security settlements along
the Eastern edge of the West Bank under the Allon plan in the mid-1970s.
Accepting that civilian settlers can serve security functions—and this is a
debatable assertion, as we have seen—the question of whether the Allon
settlements serve military need has always rested on the threat of attack
from Jordan or Iraq. It is no longer clear that Israel faces the same level of
threat from its Eastern front as it did in the 1970s. Since Jordan and Israel
have signed a Treaty of Peace, and moreover, have established partnerships
and cooperation on a broad range of issues, the threat from Jordan seems
remote.⁵¹ With the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the statesponsored threat from Iraq no longer exists. Thus, the historical context
that initially undergirded Labor’s establishment of Allon settlements has
been substantially transformed.
With regard to those settlements built in the interior of the West Bank
under the Drobles Plan of 1977, with the support of Gush Emunim and
the Begin and Shamir governments, and expanded by subsequent governments, we must resort to the contexts of geography and land use planning.
Topographically, many of the Drobles settlements have been deliberately
built along the mountain ranges overlooking Palestinian villages, giving
the settlers a strategic and symbolic advantage. The settlements’ topographical separation from the lowland villages has enabled Israeli planners
to imagine the West Bank as a patchwork of discontinuous areas held
together by raised road arteries.⁵² The Drobles settlements were placed not
only above but geographically around the seven major Palestinian cities
in the West Bank. The geographic placement coincided with the political
aims articulated by Drobles, the World Zionist Organization, the Gush
Emunim, and the Begin government: to encircle major Palestinian cities
so as to prevent these cities from growing toward one another or forming
a contiguous Palestinian state. The contexts of topography and land use
planning help clarify that the mountain-based “encirclement settlements”
represent precisely the sort of de facto colonization that the law of belligerent occupation prohibits.
Finally, the example of the security barrier that Israel has been building reveals the degree to which the settlements can have an eﬀect on
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seemingly unrelated questions, and discloses yet another breach between
Israeli and international jurisprudence. Both the Israeli High Court of
Justice and the International Court of Justice, in recent opinions about
the barrier, concur that the West Bank is under the law of belligerent
occupation, exempliﬁed by The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention.⁵³ But then their opinions diverge.
According to the Israeli court’s ruling on June 30, 2004, part of the
barrier’s route “undermines the delicate balance between the obligation
of the military commander to preserve security and his obligation to provide for the needs of the local inhabitants.”⁵⁴ Chief Justice Aharon Barak
ordered 19 miles of the barrier rerouted in order to address Palestinians’
humanitarian concerns, but permitted Israel to continue building the
barrier along a new route in consideration of Israel’s right of self-defense
against terrorism.⁵⁵ In other words, the HCJ recognized the barrier as
justiﬁable, agreeing with the Government that certain Palestinian rights
(e.g., freedom of movement) are derogable due to severe threats to Israel’s
national security. It cautioned, however, that “The purpose of the separation fence cannot be to draw a political border,”⁵⁶ and that any route must
be chosen strictly for security considerations. Where military need can be
shown to be actually in question, the court does not object to routing the
barrier into the interior of the West Bank.
On the other hand, according to the July 9, 2004 Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice, the barrier might be justiﬁed under
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) only if it hewed close to the Green
Line.⁵⁷ But the ICJ opinion ﬁnds that the barrier route does not remain on
the Green Line but “It is essentially in these [occupied] territories that Israel
has constructed or plans to construct” the barrier (para. 79).⁵⁸ Also, the
rationale that might be provided by Resolution 242 does not outweigh the
barrier’s contravention of other sources of international law. While agreeing that, under Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, certain rights are derogable, the ICJ rejected the derogability of
Palestinians’ freedom of movement in this case. Moreover, it found that the
barrier violated a number of other Palestinian rights, including the rights
to work, health, education, and an adequate standard of living.⁵⁹
It was the relation of the barrier to the settlements, however, to which
the ICJ’s opinion paid the most attention. The court argued that, because
the barrier route was drawn to enclose “80 per cent of the settlers living in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that is 320,000 individuals,”⁶⁰ it was
in danger of turning the illegal settlements into Israeli neighborhoods by
a process of de facto annexation, thus depriving Palestinians of 16 per cent
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of their territory in the West Bank. Because 160,000 Palestinians would
also be enclosed by the barrier in “almost completely encircled communities,”⁶¹ their right to self-determination would also be violated. In other
words, the barrier exceeds the negotiable margin permitted under 242
wherever the government extends it eastward into the interior of the West
Bank. If the eastward portion is employed to defend civilians in any of the
encirclement settlements, that portion becomes a prop of the resettlement
eﬀort. For these reasons, the ICJ opinion concludes that the barrier must
be dismantled in its entirety. Here, then, is yet another area of conﬂict
between the two legal regimes.
Even this brief analysis reveals that, if the law’s prescriptions are to
hold during situations of armed conﬂict, legal norms must be applied in the
contexts that actually obtain. Already in the few cases mentioned, knowledge of the context indicates that in a negotiated, two-state solution, there
might be justiﬁcation for Israel’s retention of a few settlements proximate
to the Green Line, while most would have to be dismantled.
But while the law must be contextualized, it must nevertheless remain
a primary consideration for anyone who seeks to understand the nuances
of the settlement issue. The claims of international law cannot simply be
dismissed as the products of anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism, or of a biased
world order. The international law of war began to address the issue of
civilian resettlement long before the Israeli occupation began. Since 1945,
the law of occupation has largely developed independently of UN bodies
(like the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights) that
have demonstrated a pattern of gross and reliably attested bias towards
Israel. Moreover, a key means by which Israel can resist the attempts of its
enemies to isolate it as a pariah state is by upholding the norms of treaties
to which it has bound itself. No one wants to imitate the Commission on
Human Rights by holding Israel to a higher standard than other states;
but on the other hand, Israel’s supporters should not seek to hold it to a
lower standard, either. Finally, Israeli policymakers ignore the law at their
peril, since it is the interaction of legal norms with sociopolitical realities
that will ultimately determine the fate of the settlements.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Assuming policymakers wish to adhere to the law regarding the settlements, to which law should they adhere?⁶² As we have seen, the tension between international and Israeli law has been very high. So far,
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international law’s relatively weak enforcement mechanisms have permitted lawmakers to rely on Israel’s internal jurisprudence. Yet this state of
aﬀairs may be in transition, due to the establishment of the International
Criminal Court in 2002. At the moment, the ICC cannot prosecute Israeli
oﬃcials and military commanders for the war crime of resettlement. While
the UN Security Council has the authority to refer a situation taking place
anywhere in the world to the new Court, Israelis are protected from such
a referral by the United States’ veto power. Other potential plaintiﬀs may
lodge a complaint only if either Israel or the Palestinian Authority has ratiﬁed the Rome Statute. But Israel will not ratify it, and the PA cannot do
so, having no treaty-making power.⁶³ So Israelis are apparently immune
from these plaintiﬀs as well.
Under a number of diﬀerent scenarios, however, the Court may yet
gain jurisdiction over a case. To take only the most obvious possibility:
the United States could decide to abstain on or vote in favor of a Security Council referral to the ICC. Considering the Bush Administration’s
recent declaration of support for making some settlements permanent, this
scenario is unlikely to materialize any time soon. Yet given the consistent
position taken by U.S. governments in Security Council resolutions for a
quarter of a century, it is at least possible that a future American administration will ﬁnd it in its interest to placate world and Arab opinion by permitting an ICC inquiry into Israel’s resettlement activities to go forward.
We are left to ponder what the broader consequences might be, if an
Israeli high oﬃcial were tried and convicted by the international court
as a war criminal. Some possibilities include the heightening of hostilities and the weakening of Israel’s negotiating posture; the renegotiation
of the US-Israel alliance; international ostracism the like of which even
Israel has never seen; and, as the trial was played out on Israeli television,
internal strife that could range anywhere from increasing factionalism to
serious civil disturbances. And on top of all this, there would be the shame
and anger of knowing that an international court had branded an Israeli
national as one of the world’s worst criminals.

Notes
My thanks to Georgia State University for the professional leave and grant support
that made this research possible, and to Prof. Johan van der Vyver of the Emory
University School of Law, from whom I acquired necessary concepts and tools.

130 • isr ael studies, volume 9, number 3
1. UNGAR 3379 (XXX): Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination—2400t plenary meeting determines that Zionism is a form of racism and
racial discrimination (New York, 10 November 1975); Asian Preparatory Meeting,
UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance (WCAR), Declaration and Plan of Action (Tehran, Islamic
Republic of Iran, 19–21 February 2001).
2. The UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR)—a body comprised
of the delegates of UN member states and thus overtly political—has dealt
harshly with Israel from just after the Six-Day War. In 1970, Israel was only the
second country (after Pinochet’s Chile) to be investigated under the Commission’s
secret Resolution 1503 procedure. In recent years, the public condemnations have
become an annual ritual. One month after the start of the second intifada in
September 2000, CHR held only its ﬁfth “special session” to condemn Israel for
“Grave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by
Israel” (Geneva, 17–19 October 2000) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/S-5/1. Also see UN
Economic and Social Council, “Report of the Commission on Human Rights
on its ﬁfth Special Session” (Geneva, 9 November 2000) E/2000/112. Since then,
the CHR has adopted the following resolutions condemning Israel (more than
for any other country): from the 57t session, “Situation in occupied Palestine”
(Geneva, 6 April 2001) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/2; “Human Rights in the
occupied Syrian Golan” (Geneva, 18 April 2001) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/6;
“Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories,
including Palestine” (Geneva, 18 April 2001) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/7;
“Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories” (Geneva, 18 April 2001) UN
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/8. In its 58t session, CHR adopted these resolutions:
“Situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory” (Geneva, 5
April 2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/1; “Situation in occupied Palestine”
(Geneva, 12 April 2002) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/3; “Human Rights in the
occupied Syrian Golan” (Geneva, 12 April 2002) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/6;
“Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories” (Geneva, 12 April 2002)
UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/7; “Question of the violation of human rights in
the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine” (Geneva, 15 April 2002) UN
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/8; “Human rights situation of Lebanese Detainees in
Israel” (Geneva, 19 April 2002) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/10; “The situation
of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory” (Geneva, 26 April 2002)
UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/90. In its 59t session, CHR adopted the following
resolutions: “Situation in occupied Palestine” (Geneva, 14 April 2003) UN Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2003/3; “Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan” (Geneva, 15
April 2003) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/5; “Question of the violation of human
rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine” (Geneva, 15 April
2003) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/6; “Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab
territories” (Geneva, 15 April 2003) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/7; “Human
rights situation of the Lebanese detainees in Israel” (Geneva, 16 April 2003) UN
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/8. In addition, since 1993, Israel has been the subject of

The Jewish Settlements in the West Bank

•

131

annual reports by John Dugard, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on “the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967.” Israel has been investigated by CHR’s thematic mechanisms,
including working groups or special rapporteurs on torture, arbitrary detention,
and extrajudicial and summary executions. On the website of the Oﬃce of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Palestinian human rights are the only
speciﬁc situation mentioned in CHR’s “Main Themes” (http://www.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/chr/intro.htm).
3. See Dov Sheﬁ, “The Protection of Human Rights in Areas Administered
by Israel: UN Findings and Reality,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 3, 1973,
337–61; Irwin Cotler, “Jewish NGOs and Religious Human Rights: A Case
Study,” in Michael J. Broyde and John Witte, Jr. (eds), Human Rights in Judaism:
Cultural, Religious, and Political Perspectives, (Northvale, NJ, 1998), 245–52; Natan
Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Rockville, MD, 1980); Jerome J. Shestack, “Human-Rights Issues in Israel’s
Rule of the West Bank and Gaza,” in David Sidorsky (ed), with Sidney Liskofsky
and Jerome J. Shestack, Essays on Human Rights: Contemporary Issues and Jewish
Perspectives (Philadelphia, 1979), 193–209; and Daniel P. Moynihan, “The Signiﬁcance of the Zionism-as-Racism Resolution for International Human Rights,” in
Essays on Human Rights, 37–45.
4. For accounts of Jewish human rights activism in the early decades of the
UN, see Cotler, Jewish NGOs and Religions Human Rights, 165–87; Felice Gaer,
“Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN,” in
Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder, 1996), 51–66; William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine (New York, 1998), 21–88; Nehemiah
Robinson, The United Nations and the World Jewish Congress (London, 1956),
1–120; Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order (Dobbs Ferry, NY,
1958), 113–44 and Forward; and Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
(Washington, 1944) passim.
5. American Jewish Committee, “Fact Sheet on Israeli Settlements” [unpublished brief] (New York, July 25, 2003), 2–3.
6. For a history of early settlement, see Yehiel Admnoi, Decade of Discretion:
Settlement Beyond the Green Line, 1967–1977 (Tel-Aviv, 1992) [Hebrew] passim; Ilan
Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics (Syracuse,
NY, 1995), 22–43.
7. Ilan Peleg, “The Legacy of Begin and Beginism for the Israeli Political
System,” in Gregory S. Mahler (ed), Israel after Begin (Albany, 1990), 19–49; Peleg,
Human Rights, 22–5.
8. Peleg, Human Rights, and Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977–1983: Israel’s Move to
the Right (Westport, CT, 1987), 51–142; Sasson Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York, 1988), 124–66; Arye Naor, Greater Israel: Theology and Policy]
(Haifa, 2001) passim. [Hebrew].
9. Peleg, “The Legacy,” 31.

132 • isr ael studies, volume 9, number 3
10. American Jewish Committee, “Fact Sheet,” 3; Geoﬀrey Aronson, Settlements and the Israel-Palestinian Negotiations: An Overview (Washington, DC,
1996), 14–16; Laurie Copans, “Jewish settlers granted US $34 million in tax
breaks, government report says,” Associated Press (New York, 6 November 2002);
Editorial, “Chance for Change in Israel,” New York Times (New York, 31 October
2002), A26.
11. For the controversy surrounding water use in the settlements, see, e.g., UN
ECOSOC Res. 1990/53, July 24, 1990; Yehezkel Lein, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank ( Jerusalem, May 2002), 95.
12. See page 318 in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelﬀ (eds), Documents on
the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (New York, 2000) for the 1949 Geneva Convention IV
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 49.
13. For a history of the religious wing of the settlement movement, see Amnon
Rubinstein, From Herzl to Rabin: The Changing Image of Zionism (New York,
2000), 111–158; Robert I. Friedman, Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement (New Brunswick, NJ, 1992) passim; Peleg, Human Rights, 35–43.
14. For the court’s recent aﬃrmation of the applicability of The Hague Regulations and the law of “belligerent occupation” to the West Bank, see Beit Sourik
Village Council v. The Government of Israel, HCJ 2056/04, June 30, 2004.
15. Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land [a.k.a. “The Hague Regulations”] (The Hague, 1907) Art. 42.
16. The Hague Regulations (The Hague, 1907) Art. 43.
17. Ibid., Art. 53; also see Art. 54.
18. Ibid., Art. 55.
19. See David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel
and the Occupied Territories (Albany, 2002), 21–5, 34–40, 43–56. He suggests (75)
that the civilian settlements in the territories have “made the regime there much
closer to a colonial regime than one of belligerent occupation.”
20. U.S. voting history in the UNSC on the settlements goes back to just
after the Six-Day War. The U.S. voted in favor of UN Security Council Oﬃcial
Records (UNSCOR) 237 (New York, June 14, 1967). It abstained on UNSCOR
446 (New York, 1979) and 452 (New York, 1979) both of which called the settlements a violation of international law and calling for their dismantlement and
cessation. The U.S. voted in favor of UNSCOR 465 (New York, 1980) which called
Israeli settlement activity “a ﬂagrant violation of the Geneva Convention” and
demanded that Israel dismantle the settlements. In the years following the ﬁrst
intifada, the US voted in favor of UNSCOR 607 (New York, 1988); 672 (New
York, 1990); 673 (New York, 1990); 681 (New York, 1990); 694 (New York, 1991);
726 (New York, 1992); 799 (New York, 1992); and 1435 (New York, 2002) calling
for Israel to meet its Fourth Convention obligations and/or cease settlement activity. It also abstained on or voted in favor of countless UNGA resolutions to the
same eﬀect. For a listing of such resolutions from 1967–92, see Jody Boudreault,

The Jewish Settlements in the West Bank

•

133

Emma Naughton, and Yasser Salaam (eds), U.S. Oﬃcial Statements: Israeli Settlements, the Fourth Geneva Convention (Washington, D.C., 1992) app. C, “Listing of
UN Security Council & General Assembly Resolutions Regarding Israeli Settlements for which the U.S. Voted ‘In Favor’ or ‘Abstain’,” 181; and app. E, “Listing
of UN Security Council & General Assembly Resolutions Mentioning the Fourth
Geneva Convention for which the U.S. Voted ‘In Favor’ or ‘Abstain’,” 190–3. See
the UN’s own listing at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html.
21. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(viii)
(Rome, 1998).
22. See the concluding comments of the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 19t Session, E/C.12/1Add.27 and the Committee on Human
Rights, 63rd session (Geneva, 1998), CCPR/C/79/Add93; Lein, Land Grab, 41–5.
23. The Israel Year Book on Human Rights (Tel-Aviv, 1971–present) has made
much of the Israeli legal discussion available for English readers, as will become
apparent below.
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 1980) Art. 27: “A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁcation for its failure to
perform a treaty.”
25. See Yehuda Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reﬂections on the Status
of Judea and Sumaria,” Israel Law Review, 3, 1968, 279; Meir Shamgar, “The
Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories,” IYHR, 3, 1971,
262–77; Arie Pach, “Human Rights in West Bank Military Courts,” IYHR, 7,
1977, 229, 252.
26. Shamgar, “The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories,” 262–77.
27. Quoted in John Quigley, “Loan Guarantees Israeli Settlements, and
Middle East Peace,” Vanderbilt J. of Transnational Law, 25 November 1992, 561.
28. For a legal analysis of Begin’s position, see Theodor Meron, “West Bank
and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Period of Transition,”
IYHR, 9, 1979, 106–20.
29. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Israeli Settlements—Their Conformity
with International Law ( Jerusalem, December 1996), www.israel-mfa.gov.il; see
also Yoram Dinstein, “The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights,” IYHR, 8, 1978, 104–43.
30. Yoram Dinstein, “The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights,” 107, 105; Dinstein, “The Israel Supreme Court and the Law of
Belligerent Occupation: Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,” IYHR, 25, 1995,
1–20; Dinstein, “The International Legal Status of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip-1998,” IYRH, 28, 1998, 37–49; Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, 21–40.
31. Moshe Drori, “The Legal System in Judea and Sumaria: A Review of the
Previous Decade with a Glance at the Future,” IYHR, 8, 1978, 144–77; Thomas
S. Kuttner, “Israel and the West Bank: Aspects of the Law of Belligerent Occupation,” IYHR, 7, 1977, 166–221.

134 • isr ael studies, volume 9, number 3
32. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conﬂicts, Arts. 1(4), 50, 85(4)(a), 85(5); and Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al. (“The
Celebici Case”), Judgment of Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (The Hague, 1998) paras. 96–101.
33. The Geneva Conventions’ customary status is indicated both by their
adoption by every UN member state and by states’ parties explicit statements
that the Conventions are binding on all conﬂicts including the conﬂict in the
Israeli occupied territories. See International Committee of the Red Cross,
“States party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols: Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Add. Protocols of 8 June 1977,” updated
as of 1 June 2004. http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList103/
77EA1BDEE20B4CCDC1256B6600595596. For an explicit statement that the
Fourth Convention is binding in the territories, see the “Statement” issued at the
Conference of the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention
(Geneva, 15 July 1999). Only the United States and Israel voted against the “Statement.”
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(b)(viii)
(Rome, 1998).
35. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, “Proposals in relation to elements of article 8, paragraph 2 (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court,” Second Session (New York, 26 July–13
August, 1999) PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.3.
36. Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies
(Washington, 1984), 49–63; John Quigley, “Loan Guarantees, Israeli Settlements
and Middle East Peace,” Vanderbilt J. of Transnational Law, 25, November 1992,
560–8; American Jewish Committee, “Fact Sheet on Israeli Settlements,” 10.
37. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, 41. The distinction is drawn between
de facto observance of humanitarian protocols, and the de jure obligation to
do so.
38. HC 698/80, Kawasme et al. v. Minister of Defence et al., cited in IYHR, 11,
1981, 350–1; HC 785/87, Abd el Afu et al. v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank et al., cited in IYHR, 23, 1993, 281–2.
39. See note 20.
40. Dinstein, “The Israel Supreme Court and the Law of Belligerent Occupation,” 1–20.
41. HC 606/78, Ayub et al. v. Minister of Defence et al. (the Beth El Case).
42. In a later case, Tabeeb v. Minister of Defense (1981) in IYHR, 13, 1983, 364,
the High Court sanctioned expropriation of privately held lands in the territories
for highway construction.
43. For a description of the Israeli socio-political milieu precipitated by the
Elon Moreh Case, see Geoﬀrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada:
Creating Facts on the West Bank (New York and Wash., D.C., 1990), 93–116.

The Jewish Settlements in the West Bank

•

135

44. H.C. 390/79, Mustafa Dweikat et al. v. the Government of Israel et al. (the
Elon Moreh Case), in IYHR, 9, 1979, 350.
45. Ibid.
46. For a discussion of the Jordanian/Ottoman law of land acquisition and
land use (mawat, miri, and matruke), see Peleg, Human Rights, 30–3; Lein, Land
Grab, 51.
47. See Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, 89–84.
48. Administrative Detention Appeal, 4/94, Ben-Horin v. The State of Israel,
IYHR, 30, 2000, 318–22.
49. Prohibition of administrative detention is integral to the international bill
of human rights. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 9. Israel signed the ICCPR
on December 19, 1966, and ratiﬁed it on October 3, 1991.
50. Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement, Taba, Egypt, Jan. 27, 2001; Ambassador
Miguel Moratinos, EU Special Representative to the Middle East Process, (EU
non-paper), “EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba,”
Ha’aretz February 14, 2002.
51. Jordanian-Israeli Treaty of Peace (Wadi ‘Araba, 1994) in State of Israel,
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Peace between The State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan ( Jerusalem, 1994).
52. See Eyal Weizman, “The Politics of Verticality,” openDemocracy Ltd.,
www.opendemocracy.net/debates/, posted on 24 April, 2002.
53. HC 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, June
30, 2004, para. 23. The Israeli court continues to reject Israel’s de jure obligation under the Fourth Convention, but asserts that Israel adheres to the treaty’s
“humanitarian provisions.”
54. Ibid., para. 60; BBC News, “Israel Court Orders Barrier Shift,” http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/3852385.stm, posted on June
30, 2004.
55. Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, paras. 28–30.
56. Ibid., para. 27.
57. International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Advisory Opinion, General List
No. 131 (The Hague, 9 July 2004) paras. 74 ﬀ., para. 117.
58. Ibid., para. 79.
59. Ibid., paras. 119–22, 134. The barrier may also constitute a form of collective
punishment in contravention of non-derogable humanitarian law (Hague Regulations, Art. 50; Geneva Convention IV, Art. 33; Protocol I, Art. 2(d); Protocol II,
Art. 4(1)(b). In the words of the Hague Regulations, “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inﬂicted upon the [occupied] population on account of
the acts of individuals for which they can not be regarded as jointly and severally
responsible.” On this point, see also Peleg, Human Rights in the West Bank and
Gaza, 19.

136 • isr ael studies, volume 9, number 3
60. International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences,” para. 122.
61. Ibid., para. 122.
62. Whether policymakers wish to adhere to the law is debatable. See Ehud
Sprinzak, “Illegalism in Israeli Political Culture: Theoretical and Historical Footnotes to the Pollard Aﬀair and the Shin Beth Cover-Up,” in Mahler (ed), Israel
After Begin, 51–69.
63. See the Rome Statute (Rome, 1998) Art. 12–15; the limits on the PA’s
treaty-making power are spelled out in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (the “Oslo Accords”) (Wash. D.C., 1993); other
relevant treaties include the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
(Cairo, 1994); the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(Wash., D.C., 1995); the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron ( Jerusalem, 1997); and the Wye River Memorandum (Wash., D.C., 1998).

